This essay deploys two articles Firth wrote on the future of anthropology and his accounts of Tikopia dreams to reveal a hidden ethics of time characteristic of anthropology. Our discipline is grounded in a taken for granted secular humanism. This has led to rich reflection on contrasting values and theories of ethics. But I will argue that in order for our discipline to become an uncomfortable science in relation to conventional economics and to address issues of inequality we need to supplement this inheritance. We need to construct a critical political economy of capitalist time. This would explicitly engage with the material timescapes of inequality in which ethics, knowledges and techniques of capitalist time interact. I demonstrate how such an analysis of time works in my own research on austerity policy on the Hooghly River. I then turn this approach onto the current institutional conditions of anthropology in the UK-that of financialised universities governed by debt. I conclude by suggesting some of my own utopian futures for anthropology, which are guided by a social calculus drawn from the ethics of the precarious working poor.
2 When I first joined LSE in 2000 Raymond Firth regularly attended our Friday seminars at the age of 99. We treated him with reverence as a living ancestor. On his 100 th birthday we held a celebration in the Seligman library. In turn we each praised one of his books describing how it connected with our current work. At the end he smiled and thanked us, but then suggested that the debate had been much too respectful and uncritical. Raymond Firth was proud of anthropology as an, 'uncomfortable science' that spoke truth to power and provoked contention (Firth 1981: 198) . In particular he saw it as a counterpoint to the 'dismal science' of conventional economics (Firth 1981: 198) . He admired Marx's motto from Capital, "Follow your own bent, and let people say what they will" (Firth 1972: 213) . He was, I think, disappointed by our reverence.
I am going to honour Firth's spirit of contention more fully in this article. I will do this by discussing two essays Firth wrote on the future of anthropology and his accounts of Tikopia dreams (Firth 1944 (Firth , 1992 (Firth , 2001 ). I will deploy these to reflect on a concealed ethics of time that is characteristic of anthropology. Our discipline is founded in a taken for granted secular humanism. This secular humanism has led to fertile reflection on dissimilar values. It has also created a rich stream of theorising about ethics of time from which we can still draw today. This is in fact the dominant approach to time and capitalist time within our discipline (Laidlaw 2005 , Robbins 2001 , 2010 , Guyer 2007 , Miyazaki 2013 . Yet I will propose that such an analysis of ethics alone is insufficient analytically and undermines our ability to engage in public debate. In particular it limits our comprehension of the complexity of material timescapes from which inequality and accumulation are generated. It also restricts our abilities to transform our discipline into an uncomfortable science that challenges conventional economics. Nor can it allow us to take informed action on inequality. Instead 3 we need to supplement this legacy with a more comprehensive, critical political economy of capitalist time. This would engage with the material timescapes of inequality in which the ethics, knowledges and techniques of capitalist time intersect. I will show how this political economy of time works in my own research on austerity policy on the Hooghly River in India. I will then turn this framework onto the present-day institutional conditions of anthropology in the UK-that of financialised universities governed by debt. I will conclude by proposing some of my own utopian futures. These are founded in a social calculus, which is drawn from the ethics of the precarious working poor and emerges from their experiences of inequality.
The key problem with current theoretical approaches that focus solely on ethics or the ethics of time is that they provide vistas of specific community, institution or individual's attempts to construct pasts and futures in order to take action in the present. But this only reveals a small part of the complexity of the timescapes that we inhabit. We are all attempting to mediate forms of capitalist time through our actions. Capitalist time is a dense and heteterogeneous historical product (Bear 2014). At its centre are forms of abstract time reckoning that act as a universal measure of value, but which conflict with our concrete experiences of time. Its social disciplines derive from Christian practice, but are marked as secular and universal. Its nationalist politics is founded on representations of the natural connections of communities through a homogenous historical time. Its prosthetics of science and technology tie social, human time to external non-human rhythms. Within concrete timescapes of households, neighbourhoods, institutions, workplaces, cities and environments we encounter and attempt to mediate the complex contradictions of capitalist time. Our ethics are attempts to imagine collectivities and create agency in the midst of these. They are therefore a highly significant source of social action and politics, but an analysis of them is not sufficient in order to understand and act on inequality (Shah 2014 could, a speculation rather than forecast or prediction. He explained that his uncertainty was caused by a crisis in the discipline that reflected a crisis in the world. He feared that the pursuit of knowledge was at risk because of a "philistine government" (Firth 1992: 222) .
Their measures threatened the future of the universities through: budget cuts; the separation of research from teaching and emphasis on policy-oriented research. Firth echoed the crisis, uncertain futures characteristic of the new speculative planning of the 1990s. In its early years its members expressed biopolitical fears of miscegenation. Through the thirties it moved away from racially grounded eugenics to become a place for progressive debtates on contraception sex education and divorce. Malinowski and his students took part in as a paternalist attempt to improve social and economic conditions for the masses (Firth 1981) . This was a position we can see expressed in Firth's 1944 essay on the future. He pursued these values in the post-war period through his studies of working class and migrant kinship forms in 1950s London (Firth 1956 ). He also lived them. When he found himself in the middle of a devastating famine in Tikopia in 1952 he acted as an administrator of relief.
Firth held fast to this ethics throughout his life. He was a signatory to the second humanist manifesto in 1972 dedicated to anti-racism, human rights and progress. This was guided by motto that "no god must save us; we must save ourselves." His essay in 1992 continues to assert that improvement is still possible. All we need to do is act in the right way at the right time according to our individual values. This is a particular secular ethics of time that has been described by Copeman and Quack (2015) . As I have argued recently (Bear 2016, inspired by Morosanu and Ringel 2016) this contains an amplified sense of our own 7 agency to intervene in, or even trick time. This agency is often asserted heroically in relation to giant forces such as capital and crises such as political change.
Firth strongly held this ethic and was, as a result, fascinated by contrasting systems of value (Firth 1953) . In this he was not alone. He demonstrates a position characteristic of our discipline as a whole. His writing on Tikopia dreams from 1934 onwards in particular exemplifies this fascination. Firth argued that these dreams were a response to uncertainty This is a tradition that we see continued in the present in recent accounts influenced by
Aristotle and Foucault (Laidlaw 2013 ).
But if we are to honour Firth in his wish for anthropology to be an uncomfortable social science we need to do more. We need to construct a critical political economy of capitalist time. This would draw on the rich tradition of analysis of ethics within anthropology inherited from Firth, but would turn this explicitly towards secular humanism.
Yet it would also need to track the knowledges and techniques of time in capitalism. Most importantly it would examine how ethics, techniques and knowledges combine in our practices within specific timescapes. This form of analysis would link questions of freedom to those of inequality and accumulation. This would honour Firth's commitment to social justice, but also show that personal ethics alone cannot resolve the issues that face us. I will now turn to our resources for constructing such an approach.
Towards a Critical Political Economy of Capitalist Time
Since Firth wrote his essay in 1992 anthropologists have begun to explicitly examine the times of capitalist modernity. This work has emerged from a rapprochement between the anthropology of history and the anthropology of capitalism (Bear 2016). Yet it is more than a result of disciplinary debate. In their field-sites anthropologist are more frequently encountering insecurity and precarity. Alongside this accumulation through capital and property ownership is producing global elites with greater security (Piketty 2014 , Yanagisako 2015 . By focussing attention on capitalist time we are able to measure and criticise inequality in new ways.
To explore this new work I will briefly discuss three paths it has taken. My overall argument will be that we now need to unify these separate forms of analysis into a more Turning first to ethics. Recent important research has explored how people engage with inequality and rebuild agency. In particular Harms (2011 Harms ( , 2013 and Han (2011 Han ( , 2012 track how the working poor respond ethically to precarity. Applying a similar lens, there are rich ethnographies of middle class groups experiencing an end to linear historicism as a result of downward mobility in austerity (Knight 2015, Knight and Stewart 2016) . Muir (2016) links their subsequent disillusionment to a politics of privatisation and neo-liberalism. Other anthropologists explore the secular humanist ethics of time through a focus on time-tricking (Morosanu and Ringel 2016) . Time-tricking is the sense that you can out-maneuver, overcome or manipulate time. It is visible in a range of contexts from Greek housewives managing family credit (Streinzer 2016) to London boat-dwellers trying to slow down time (Bowles 2016) .
Another path for research has been a focus on the expert knowledges of capitalist time associated with bureaucratic, scientific and corporate institutions. These epistemes are given form in documents and visual representations. They take the shape of meaningful chronotopes and performative promises (Abram and Wezkalnys 2013) . In scientific laboratories they aim to shape and predict non-human and human cellular rhythms (Franklin 2014) . In corporations and popular economies they project hidden frontiers of capital (Tsing 2005) . Ethnography tracks some of their current dominant forms in recent accounts of the security state; biocapital; and speculation (Lakoff 2008 , Holbraad and Peterson 2013 , Fortun 2001 , Zaloom 2009 ).
The third path for research has been techniques of time. These techniques are These three separate paths in the study of capitalist time have produced many insights.
We can now trace the various kinds of time-maps within capitalism and track their different 11 forms of legitimacy. But to construct critical political economy of capitalist time we need to take one more step in our analysis. We need to examine the interrelationship of these various time-maps in mediating action in the world. This is where the heuristic of time-scapes is helpful.
May The new techniques and knowledges of time on the Hooghly generated deepening inequality. This was experienced as uncertainty about the future. State employees were not sure they would retain their jobs. The working poor on the river feared a sharp slide into poverty. There was little hope for political coalitions. Class identities were fragmented in a zero sum game for access to the state's remaining resources. Workers wanted unions, but the unions had become the brokers of informalised labour. Public sector workers actively stigmatized private sector workers seeing them as the cause for decline in the state.
Ethics too were fragmented. Distinct senses of workmanship emerged from the different kinds of labour people carried out on the river. People attempted to suture together the increasingly conflictual rhythms of global trade and production. Their different experiences of the timescape of the river led to distinct ethics. State employees described their work as a historical, nationalist duty grounded in care for the goddess Ma Ganga and for rebuilding a sonar Bangla (golden Bengal) lost at partition. They feared the corrosive forces of Muslims, the private sector and infomalised workers. It was the benevolent state alone that could achieve the public good. River pilots asserted a historic heroic duty of care for each other inventing new technical devices to fix the contradictions of accidents on the river. . And yet our power is dependent on that of our households and communities, which are sustained by the goddess Ma Monosha. So these households too must be supported.
Informalised workers apply a social calculus to the economy. They judge it according the quality of the social relations it produces-whether these are just or fair.
I have led you through the timescape of austerity on the Hooghly River showing how techniques, knowledges and ethics intersect. To focus on one of these elements alone would have limited our understanding. But how can this timescape help us to approach the larger question of accumulation from time within the global debt economy? By answering this question I will be able to return to our timescape of labour-the debt-governed university. This transformation is not simply a continuation of the longer-term history of forms of governance by debt or the global empire of debt initiated at the end of the Bretton Woods agreement tracked by Graeber (2014) . It is a radical historical break in the form of political debt, which has for the first time in human history made our governments subject to the sovereignty of the market and central banks. In fact a macro-economist has recently described the UK to me as the feudal fiefdom of the Bank of England and the City of London.
What then were the key changes to government financing? Governments no longer print or borrow money according to political rhythms. Instead they issue sovereign debt bonds to the central bank, which then pass these on to market maker banks who use this to trade in the primary and secondary bond markets. This practice was imposed by the IMF and World Bank in the Global south based on the Baker-Brady plans. It was rolled out with the Maastrict Treaty in Europe. It was adopted with enthusiasm in some places such as India, UK and Ireland as best practice. It was a technocratic model based on the state starvation thesis.
This thesis is that any share of credit or capital held by the state is less productive than that held by the general public. Therefore there should be a systematic redistribution of access to capital and credit away from the state. This should occur through the mechanisms of independent central banks diverting capital towards the banking system through sovereign debt bonds. What this theory has meant in practice is the development of speculative bubbles of capital within the banking system and growth of derivatives. Sovereign debt bonds anchored the growth of complex derivatives in the 1990s. They also provide the basis for the growth of the shadow banking system. In addition the redistribution of capital into the hands of the public has in fact meant the redistribution of debt relations. Or in other words the extension of personal credit to all of us in the forms of student loans, mortgages and credit cards (Lazzarato 2015 , James 2014 ). This has papered over the declining real value of wages since the 1980s.
But what are the effects of these changes to sovereign debt on the policies of governments and the public sector? The economic policy of governments is increasingly oriented to keeping the financial markets happy through deficit reduction. The public sector is hollowed out. The government is dependent for its funding on its relationships with large market maker banks so they will always bail them out. Government financing is also dependent on volatile financial market sentiment and the investment classes. Economic policy decisions are taken so as to maintain as much as possible the existing ratings of bonds in the ratings agencies such as Standard and Poors, Moody's etc. These organisations rate bonds according to how they perform in the market, not on any other criteria. In its most perverse form this sovereign debt regime is used to support the monetary supply to banks and financial markets. Quantitative easing is the highest realization of this. Quantitative easing is the buying back of government bonds from banks in order to inject them and the financial markets with cash. Government borrowing used to be about the creation of money in order to enact political decisions, a quite different phenomenon from that we see in quantitative easing. Now it is a source of financial speculation and rentier profits-or private accumulation from public infrastructure. There is a domination of the financial markets over political institutions. This makes any new radical economic policy of redistribution unlikely.
India and Britain in the 1990s both turned to these mechanisms hence the echoes and resonances I experienced.
Sovereign debt has been financialised. Our political institutions have been tied into volatile short-term market time. This has occurred through the technai of sovereign debt bonds, repos and derivatives that link profit to the passing of time. An anthropology that focusses on the ethics of capitalist time alone can't alter this situation; we need to carry out a critical political economy of capitalist timescapes and act on the knowledge we acquire from this (Durrenberg and Palsson 2014). I will now show just how important such an analysis is by turning it onto the current institutional conditions of anthropology in the UK. We too are becoming disciplined by debt and tied through techniques of time to the financial markets.
The Debt Timescape of the UK University
One of the less noticed post-Brexit headlines was the announcement from the ratings agency Moody's that it had downgraded the credit ratings of six UK Universities (Cardiff, De Montfort, Keele, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester) . This, Moody's explained was in part because of the overall downgrading of the UK economic outlook and its sovereign debt ratings (India Infoline News Service June 2016). But it also reflected the risks of the loss of EU funding for research and declining number of students due to immigration curbs. What is important about this news story is that it is gives us a vista onto the governance by debt that we all work within. Since 2010, under the political project of austerity universities have begun to be drawn into interlinked debt regimes-technocratic governance by debt and financialized debt. This is part of a longer history of the introduction of audit regimes to universities that has been importantly critiqued (Strathern 2000 , Shore 2010 , Shore et al 2015 , Wright and Rabo 2010 . But it is also a significant shift because it means that universities in the UK are not just governed like corporations or public-private partnerships.
They are taking on the same form as contemporary corporations with financialized debt-bond relationships at their core.
Technocratic governance by debt occurs through student tuition loans. These were introduced to get the cost of funding universities off the government's books. As McGettigan argues these moves were guided by Friedman's models of education as a private benefit to individual earning power (2015) . These mechanisms are deepening inequalities between institutions and producing new measures of our worth. Since the introduction of £9000 tuition fees Russell group institutions have had their incomes and expenditures increase rapidly (all figures from Holmwood, Hickey, Cohen, Wallis 2016) . While that of the post-92 group of universities has declined by around 10 percent. Interestingly most of the increased income in the Russell group is not spent on teaching staff, but on the non-staff budget of institutions (managers, estate, and servicing loans). Our labour and the debt relations of a younger generation are fueling an expansion of estate, managers and financial rentier income. These debt relations will soon be generating new measures for the worth of our work as well (McGettigan 2015 , Holmwood, Hickey, Cohen, Wallis 2016 . Under the teaching excellence framework universities will soon be pushed to release student earnings data for degrees and institutions. This tests us according to the criteria of 'value for the government's money' in generating high incomes for individuals. Although the measures will be adjusted for entry 20 requirements and the ethnicity of entrants the planned metrics will be used by managers to push even harder on academics to 'perform.' This technocratic disciplining by debt relations is changing the character of universities.
At the same time since 2010 the decline in government funding for universities has led them into financialized debt relations. In these private accumulation occurs from the public infrastructure of our institutions and from our labour. Institutions experiencing declining funding and under pressure in the new competitive market to capture more students with better facilities have taken on publicly traded and privately placed bonds. These are for vast amounts of money in the ranges of £66 to £250 million. The less elite universities predictably are seen as more risky and have to pay a higher rate of interest on their bonds. As
Paul Robert Gilbert, who has pioneered this argument has suggested, riskiness for the lender is judged by the prospective ability to attract students. Therefore as he points out in effect students are used as collateral for the loans (2016). The European Investment Bank (EIB) has been a key player in developing this financialisation, giving vast loans to attract matching private funding. As the EIB reports on its website "the United Kingdom is the largest beneficiary of EIB university lending and in the last 5 years the EIB has provided £1.45 billion for investment in twenty universities across the country" (EIB 2015). University bonds are described in a recent FT article as highly popular in primary and secondary markets. This is because of the steady income of tuition fees, endowments and the likelihood that failing institutions would be bailed out by the government. But it also warns investors that "behind the shiny new investment is an increasingly cut-throat market for students" (Financial Times 2016) No doubt university bonds are being incorporated into complex derivatives. Through these techne the passage of time in our institutions and our labour are harnessed to the creation of profit. It is the elite institutions which will be favoured by these technai, They will have lower rates of interest for whatever loans they take and less pressured 21 staff as a result. Most problematically these figures of debt give our managers a quantitative authority to carry out their programmes of reform. It is hard to look beyond the figures of debt to question the decisions that have created them or to question the measures to be taken.
Income on bonds must be paid whatever the consequences for our institutions. This is a quality of debt that I saw playing out in the Kolkata Port Trust, and now within our own universities.
I don't need to describe the timescape generated by these mechanisms (for important, ethnographies of the new public management in universities see Shore 2007 , 2010 . We all live in it; a pressure to teach and research more in a more condensed amount of time. A lengthening and intensification of the working day and week that draws on our strong vocation. A competitive push to expand and attract students and staff from each other. Inequalities between zero hours, temporary and permanent faculty. This is a timescape that whatever our ethical mediation of it generates inequality. This inequality exists within the student body; between institutions; among various kinds of university labour; between young and old and between investor-rentiers and the rest of society. Yet to fully realise our role as an uncomfortable social science we need more than this ethics. We need to bravely and publically debate with conventional economics. We need to critically engage with the timescapes of accumulation and inequality that we are also part of.
Conclusion-Utopian Futures
Such a critique should be founded on a political economy of capitalist time. We could do more than critique, however. We could look for alternatives within the ruins around us now. I have drawn on the social calculus of precarious informalised workers on the Hooghly to propose some of these for sovereign debt (Bear 2015) . This social calculus directs us towards forms of praxis that would undo the financialisation and economistic politics of our public institutions. It opens up questions of social justice and pushes us towards a more human orientation towards the economy (as proposed by Hart 2008) . It also allows us to measure the value of our institutions according to the qualities of social relations and degrees of inequality they generate (it therefore offers an alternative to anarchist rejections of all state institutions pace Graeber 2015) . Such a social calculus has led me to propose new technical forms for public financing. The most radical of these would be the formation of a National
Wealth fund in which the government would print its own money to spend on redistribution, education, health and green infrastructure. This would need to be accompanied by the creation of democratically elected boards for central banks to open them up to public 23 scrutiny. We would also need to radically reform the infrastructure of banking, which at the moment uses government money or the currency of political power for market ends. Most banks (since they are stabilised and funded by the state) should become social banks. They should redistribute resources in society as much as possible through their interest rates and lending policies. Less radical moves would be to end the secondary and derivative markets in sovereign debt bonds. And to develop long term political bonds outside of financial markets with non-market legal forms applied to them-so the best rates of interest would go to the most socially useful institutions. Similarly ratings agencies would be reformed so that they measured the value of the bonds for public institutions according to how much social value and redistribution they generated. Alongside these measures we would need new international organisations. We would first forgive all sovereign debt effectively dissolving the role of the World Bank and IMF. Instead we would form an International tax collecting and redistribution regimes, which would buttress the powers of national government to collect tax. But all of this starts with a new kinds of politics. This would explain the deep costs of the financialisation of public institutions. We need to assert again a unique value for the public commonwealth and the value of all of our labour--most importantly that of precarious workers like those on the Hooghly who produce for us.
This will all sound too utopian, even unrealistic I am sure. But a place we could start is close to home in our own universities. We could question the governance by debt of student loans and the use of our labour to generate profits in financial markets. Four places to start would be: citizens audits of university financing (inspired by the citizens audits of Debt
Resistance UK); challenges to TEF metrics that will determine the worth of our labour;
ending of zero hours contracts and underpaid temporary staff in the university and most crucially asserting the value of not for profit public universities. Or in other words we need to become clearer in our public conversations and bolder in our campaigns on the future of the
